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IN T E R EST O F AMICI CURIA E1 
Amici are scholars with the Information Society Project at Yale Law School 
(ISP)2:  Wendy Seltzer , a Senior Fellow at the ISP, writes on law and technology 
of free expression and user innovation, including digital copyright, software patent, 
and information privacy. She founded and leads the Chilling Effects 
Clearinghouse, exploring legal threats to online expression at 
https://www.chillingeffects.org/; Margot K aminski, Research Scholar in Law and 
Executive Director of the ISP, writes on privacy, information politics and First 
Amendment issues; Priscilla Smith, Senior Fellow of the ISP, Jennifer K eighley, 
Resident Fellow of the ISP, and Genevieve Scott, Resident Policy Fellow of the 
ISP, research and write on reproductive rights, with a particular focus on 
information policy and new technologies.   
SU M M A R Y O F A R G U M E N T  
The grant of a patent is a narrowly tailored exception to our free market system, 
D³FDUHIXOO\FUDIWHGEDUJDLQ´GHVLJQHGWRVWULNHDEDODQFHEHWZHHQWKHDYRLGDQFHRI
monopolies that stifle competition and the need to encourage innovation.  Bonito                                                                                                                 
1 By  Order  issued  April  30,  2012,  this  Court  authorized  the  filings  of  amicus  briefs  
in  this  case  without  consent  of  either  party.     No counsel for a party authored this 
brief in whole or in part, and no person or entity other than amici and their counsel 
made any monetary contribution toward the preparation or submission of this brief. 
2 The ISP is an intellectual center addressing the implications of new information 
technologies for law and society, guided by the values of democracy, human 
development, and social justice. The Fellows participate in this case in their 
personal capacity; titles are used only for purposes of identification.   
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Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, 86%HFDXVH³LPLWDWLRQ
and refinement through imitation are both necessary to invention itself and the very 
lifeblood of a competitive economy´ Id. at 150, tKH ³VWULQJHQW UHTXLUHPHQWV IRU
patent protection seek to ensure that ideas in the public domain remain there for the 
XVHRIWKHSXEOLF´ Id.7KLVLVHVSHFLDOO\WUXHIRU³>S@henomena of nature, though 
just discovered, . . . as they are the basic tools of scientific and technological 
ZRUN´Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972).  In reaffirming Gottschalk  
in its recent decision in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, 
Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012), the Supreme Court emphasized this ³FRQFHUQ WKDW
patent law not inhibit further discovery by improperly tying up the future use of 
ODZV RI QDWXUH´ Id. at 1301; id. at 1294 (unanimously invalidating patents that 
ULVNHG³inhibiting [the] use [of underlying natural laws] in the making of further 
GLVFRYHULHV´).  
In this brief, Amici show that WKH SDWHQWV KHUH XSVHW SDWHQW ODZ¶V FDUHIXO
balance.  First, the evidence establishes that the promise of a patent was 
unnecessary to incentivize research on the BRCA genes in the first place.  Second, 
0\ULDG¶VPRQRSRO\RQ WKH LQIRUPDWLRQFRQWDLQHG LQ%UHDVW&DQFHU6XVFHSWLELOLW\
*HQHV  DQG  KHUHDIWHU ³%5&$  has inhibited and continues to inhibit 
innovation in the field of medical research on breast cancer and other diseases by 
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preventing researchers from using products of nature to make further advances.3  
Specifically, the BRCA 1/2 patents limit multiplex and full genome testing, as well 
as research on the relationship between BRCA 1/2 and other genetic diseases.  As a 
result of obtaining a patent on a product of nature, Myriad has a "double 
monopoly" on genetic testing of the BRCA genes that dissuades Myriad from 
engaging in additional research, charging reasonable prices, and cross-licensing 
technology.  Accordingly, this Court should invalidate the patents at issue. 
A R G U M E N T 
I. 7KH&RXUW¶V5HFHQW'HFLVLRQLQMayo Emphasizes the Importance of 
0DLQWDLQLQJWKH3DWHQW6\VWHP¶VBalance Between Incentivizing 
Research and Encouraging Innovation. 
In its recent decision in Mayo, the Supreme Court struck down a process patent 
FODLP WKDW WKUHDWHQHG WR ³LQKLELW IXUWKHU GLVFRYHU\ E\ LPSURSHUO\ W\LQJ XS WKH
IXWXUHXVHRIODZVRIQDWXUH´132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294.  The Court cautioned against 
SDWHQWLQJFODLPV³VRDEVWUDFWDQGVZHHSLQJDVWRFRYHUERWh known and unknown 
XVHV´ of patented subject matter (id. (citing Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67-
68 (1972)), finding that ³XSKROGLQJWKHSDWHQWVZRXOGULVNGLVSURSRUWLRQDWHO\W\LQJ
                                                                                                                
3 BRCA1 and BRCA2 ³EHORQJ WR D FODVV RI JHQHV NQRZQ DV WXPRU VXSSUHVVRUV
0XWDWLRQRIWKHVHJHQHVKDVEHHQOLQNHGWRKHUHGLWDU\EUHDVWDQGRYDULDQFDQFHU´
National Cancer Institute Fact Sheets, BRCA1 and BRCA2: Cancer Risk and 
Genetic Testing, (Mar. 29, 2009), http://www.cancer.gov/ 
cancertopics/factsheet/Risk/BRCA . 
4    
up the use of the underlying natural laws, inhibiting their use in the making of 
IXUWKHUGLVFRYHULHV´Id. at 1294.  As the Court explained, 
« even though rewarding with patents those who discover new laws 
of nature and the like might well encourage their discovery, those 
laws and principles, considered generally, are the ³WKHEDVLF WRROVRI
VFLHQWLILF DQG WHFKQRORJLFDO ZRUN´ citing Benson, 409 U.S. at 67).  
And so there is a danger that the grant of patents that tie up their use 
will inhibit future innovation premised upon them, a danger that 
becomes acute when a [patent@«IRUHFORVHVPRUH IXWXUH LQQRYDWLRQ
than the underlying discovery could reasonably justify. 
 
Id. at 1301.  Just as 3URPHWKHXV¶SDWHQWVVHWIRUWKODZVRIQDWXUH id. at 1296 (the 
relationships between concentrations of certain metabolites in the blood and the 
effect or ineffect of a dosage of a drug), so too 0\ULDG¶VSDWHQWVDUHEDVHGRQWKH
recognition of existing relationships in nature, the nucleotide sequence on a strand 
of DNA.4  -XVWDV3URPHWKHXV¶SDWHQWV WKUHDWHQHG³to inhibit the development of 
more refined treatment recommendations«WKDWFRPELQH3URPHWKHXV¶FRUUHODWLRQV
with later discovered features of metabolites, human physiology, or individual 
patient characteristics,´5 so too here the tradeoff that normally occurs in the patent 
system is undermined.6  0\ULDG¶VSDWHQWVSUHYHQWWKHXVHRIQDWXUDOSKHQRPHQRQWo 
conduct additional research, discover other natural relationships, and develop 
                                                                                                                
4 Stiglitz Decl. ¶ 25 (describing patented information as ³WKH YHU\ LQVWUXFWLRQV
LQVLGHHDFKRIRXUFHOOVWKDWGHWHUPLQHZKDWSURWHLQVDUHSURGXFHG´). 5  Mayo6&WDW³>W@he presence here of the basic underlying concern 
that these patents tie up too much future use of laws of nature simply reinforces our 
conclusion that the processes described in the patents are not patent eligible´  
6 Stiglitz Decl. at. ¶¶ 10, 12, 25. 
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innovations in disease treatments that could save lives.  As in Mayo, 0\ULDG¶V
SDWHQWVFUHDWHDQ³DFXWHGDQJHU´EHFDXVHWKH\GRQRWFRQILQHWKHLUUHDFKUHVXOWLQJ
in extreme limits on invention and research. Id. at 1301-1302.  As in Mayo, 
0\ULDG¶V SDWHQWV foreclose more future innovation than 0\ULDG¶V underlying 
discovery can ³reasonably justify.´  See id. 
II. Myriad¶s Patents Were Unnecessary To Incentivize the Identification 
of the BR C A 1/2 Genes. 
In its report entitled Gene Patents and Licensing Practices and Their Impact on 
Patient Access to Genetic Tests KHUHLQDIWHU ³6$&*+6 UHSRUW´ WKH 6HFUHWDU\¶V
Advisory Committee on Genetics, Health and Society concluded that patents are 
not necessary to ensure that genetic tests come to market,7 finding significant 
evidence that most gene discoveries are in fact not patent-driven.8  Advances in 
genetics have been and continue to be funded significantly by the publically 
financed human genome project and U.S. federal funds.9  SACGHS reported no 
                                                                                                                
7 'HS¶WRI+HDOWK	+XPDQ6HUYSACCHS report at 26 (April 2010), available at 
http://oba.od.nih.gov/oba/sacghs/ reports/SACGHS_patents_report_2010.pdf.  
8 Id. at 2.  
9 Id. at 26; Ledbetter Decl. ¶ 13 , Aug. 20, 2009; See also Cho Decl.¶ 22, Aug. 17, 
2009 (study showing 67% of US gene patents on genetic diagnosis were for 
discoveries funded by the U.S. government) (citing Schissel, A., Merz, JF, Cho, 
MK., Survey Confirms Fears About Licensing of Genetic Tests, 402 Nature 118 
(1999); see also &KR'HFO$XJ³PDMRULW\RISDWHQWHGJHQH
GLVFRYHULHVZHUHVXSSRUWHGE\WKHIHGHUDOJRYHUQPHQW´ 
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cases in which possession of exclusive rights was necessary for the development of 
a particular genetic test, including both common and rare genetic diseases.10 
This case proves the point.  As the District Court Opinion discusses at length, the 
discovery of the BRCA 1/2 gene patents received significant federal funding 
through the National Institutes of Health, and was made possible by the use of 
known sequencing techniques11 and the scientific contributions of various teams of 
researchers, including those staunchly opposed to patenting the BRCA 1/2 genes.12 
III. Rather Than Encouraging Innovation and Scientific Progress, 
Myriad¶s Patents Stifle Advances in Medical Testing. 
 
The patents in this case prevent research into relationships between the BRCA 
genes and other cancers as well as other genetic diseases, delaying the discovery of 
life-saving information about breast cancer, ovarian cancer, and other diseases 
causing significant harm to thousands of Americans each year.  These limitations 
on innovation are not a normal consequence of the patent system; they are a 
consequence of the overextension of the patent system to cover the discovery of 
                                                                                                                
10 SACGHS report at 2. 
11 $VV¶QIRU0ROHFXODU3DWKRORJ\HWDOY8SPTO , 653 F.3d 1329, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 
2011) (Bryson, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part) (95a); $VV¶Q IRU
Molecular Pathology et. al. v. USPTO, 702 F. Supp.2d 181, 201-202 (S.D.N.Y. 
2010) (155a-156a). 
12 Stiglitz Decl. ¶ 26, Jan. 19, 2010; $VV¶QIRU0ROHFXODU3DWKRORJ\HWDO 702 F. 
Supp.2d at 201-202 (154a-158a) (citing Jeff M. Hall et al., Linkage of Early-Onset 
Familial Breast Cancer to Chromosome 17q21, 250 Science 1684 (1990); Richard 
Wooster, et. al, Identification of the Breast Cancer Susceptability Gene BRCA 2, 
378 Nature 789-92 (1995)). 
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VFLHQWLILF IDFW FUHDWLQJ D PRQRSRO\ RQ WKH ³EDVLF WRROV´ RI VFLHQWLILF UHVHDUFK
Benson, 409 U.S. at 67.  Given the fundamental nature of the information 
contained in a human gene, it is unsurprising that the BRCA 1/2 patents on human 
genes have retarded innovation and stifled competition. See $VV¶Q IRU0ROHFXODU
Pathology v. U .S. Patent and Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 
2012) (Bryson, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part) (³>0\ULDG¶Vclaims] are 
not directed to patentable sXEMHFWPDWWHUDQGLIVXVWDLQHG«will likely have broad 
FRQVHTXHQFHV«HYHQ WKRXJK 0\ULDG¶V FRQWULEXWLRQ WR WKH ILHOG LV QRW UHPRWHO\
FRQVRQDQWZLWKVXFKHIIRUWV´). 
By threatening litigation and sending cease and desist notices,13 Myriad 
prevents researchers at top academic institutions from researching alternative and 
less costly means of testing for mutations in the BRCA 1/2 genes.14  In addition, 
because of its patents, Myriad controls all test data in the United States, but fails to 
make this data readily available to researchers, limiting their ability to conduct 
research on breast cancer, ovarian cancer, and other cancers and diseases.15   
                                                                                                                
13 Myriad aggressively enforces its patent against private research labs, nonprofits 
research institutions, and universities.  $VV¶QIRU0ROHFXODU3DWKRORJ\HWDO702 
F. Supp.2d at 204-206 (163a-166a); SACGHS report at 33. 
14 Ledbetter Decl. ¶¶ 13, 16, Aug. 20, 2009. 
15 Swisher Decl. ¶¶ 14, 15, 19, Aug. 19, 2009. 
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A . 0\ULDG¶V Patents Place L imits on Multiplex and Full Human 
Genome Testing. 
0\ULDG¶V SDWHQWV GLUHFWO\ LQWHUIHUH ZLWK UHVHDUFKHUV¶ DELOLW\ WR LQYHVWLJDWe 
complex diseases.  In most cases, rather than associating a single gene with a given 
disease, multiple genes play a causative role.16  For example, autism is associated 
with more than ten different genes.17  Similarly, BRCA 1/2 may be associated with, 
and serve as a predictor for, cancers other than breast or ovarian cancer, and even 
other diseases.18  ³0XOWLSOH[WHVWLQJ´LVDUHFHQWLQQRYDWLRQLQJHQHWLFWHVWLQJZKLFK
allows researchers to simultaneously test multiple genetic markers19 or to 
simultaneously test for multiple conditions.20  Screening may eventually be done 
by affordable whole-genome sequencing, including newborn screening.21   
However, multiplex testing of multiple genes raises concerns that it will violate 
multiple patents.22  The number of patents protecting genes spread among various 
                                                                                                                
16 Ledbetter Decl. ¶ 24, Aug. 20, 2009. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at ¶ 25. 
19 SACGHS report at 49. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. (citing 7KH3UHVLGHQW¶V&RXQFLORQ%LRHWKLFV The changing moral focus of 
newborn screening: an ethical anDO\VLV E\ WKH3UHVLGHQW¶V&RXQFLO RQ%LRHWKLFV
Chapter Three: The Future of Newborn Screening (2008)). 
22 Id. (citing D Nicol, Navigating the molecular patent landscape, 18 Expert 
Opinion on Therapeutic Pat. 461, 468 (2009); S Soini, S Aymé, & G Matthijs, 
Patenting and licensing in genetic testing: ethical, legal and social issues, 16 Eur. 
J. of Human Genetics S10, S12 (2008); TJ Ebersole, MC Guthrie, & JA Goldstein, 
Patent pools as a solution to the licensing problems of diagnostic genetics 17 
Intellectual Property & Technology Law Journal 6 (2005)).   
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patent holders and assignees, thus far 20% of the human genome,23 has led to a 
³SDWHQW WKLFNHW´ ³D GHQVH ZHE RI RYHUODSSLQJ LQWHOOHFWXDO SURSHUW\ ULJKWV WKDW D
company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new 
WHFKQRORJ\´24  Because of the thousands of patents claiming gene molecules or 
methods of associating a gene with a phenotype, developing multiplex testing, 
parallel sequencing and whole-genome sequencing will depend upon the 
acquisition of multiple rights or licensees to patents on genes, which will likely be 
prohibitively expensive and complex under current law.25  
A recent study performed by the Centre for Intellectual Property Rights and the 
Centre for Human Genetics in Belgium confirms that 64% of patents relating to 
genetic testing will be difficult to invent around.26  Patents on human genes are 
often GLIILFXOW WR LQWHUSUHW  )RU H[DPSOH FODLP VL[ RI 0\ULDG¶V SDWHQW RQ WKH
BRCA 1 gene sequence is so broad that it includes at least 4% and as much as 
                                                                                                                
23 K. Huang & F. Murray, Does Patent Strategy Shape the Long-Run Supply Of 
Public Knowledge? Evidence F rom Human Genetics, 52 Acad. of Mgmt. J. 1193 
(2006). 
24 $VV¶QIRU0ROHFXODU3DWKRORJ\, 653 at 1379-1380 (Bryson, J. concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (citing SACGHS Report 49-  ³%road claims to 
genetic material present a significant obstacle to the next generation of innovation 
in genetic medicine²multiplex test and whole-genome sequencing´; SACGHS 
report at 51 (citing C Shapiro, Navigating the patent thicket: cross licenses, patent 
pools, and standard setting, 1 ,QQRYDWLRQ3RO¶\DQGWKH(FRQ 119 (2001)).   
25 See $VV¶QIRU0ROHFXODU3DWKRORJ\, 653 F.3d at 1380 (Bryson, J. concurring in 
part and dissenting in part); SACGHS report at 51-52. 
26 SACGHS report at 15-16 (citing I. Huys, et al., Legal uncertainty in the area of 
genetic diagnostic testing, 27 Nature Biotechnology 903 (2009)). 
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100% of the genes in the human genome.27  Patent claims that are difficult to 
FLUFXPYHQWFDQRQO\EHHYDGHGDIWHU³DVXEVWDQWLDOLQYHVWPHQWRIPRQH\DQGWLPH
DVZHOODVD ODUJHDPRXQWRI LQYHQWLYHQHVV´28  Even if many of those patents are 
ultimately found to be invalid for anticipation or obviousness, the costs associated 
with litigating the scope of the patents is prohibitive.29  As the SACGHS report 
discusses, under the standard set out in eBay v. MercExchange, L.L.C ., a multiplex 
developer faces the risk of an injunction and will not learn if that injunction will 
issue until after lengthy and expensive litigation.30  
The Association of Genetic Counselors concurs that exclusive licenses and 
SDWHQWV ZLOO ³KLQGHU WKH FRVW-effectiveness of genetic testing, particularly when 
analysis of multiple genes or the entire genome is necessary to assess the risk or 
H[LVWHQFHV RI D GLVHDVH´31  As multiplex testing and whole-genome sequencing 
progress as medical tools, thickets of gene patents will discourage the development 
of advanced tests and their application to medicine.32  If more than one gene is 
patented, researchers are prevented from developing a comprehensive, cost-                                                                                                                
27 Mason. Supp. Decl.  ¶¶ 3-6, Jan. 19, 2010. 
28 SACGHS report at 16. 
29 Id. at 51-52 (citing Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Noncompliance, Nonenforcement, 
Nonproblem? Rethinking the Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 45 Hou. L. 
Rev. 1059, 1076-1080 (2008)). 
30 Id. at 53 (lack of clarity regarding how ebay will be applied has chilling effect on 
research) (citing eBay v. MercExchange, L.L.C ., 547 U.S. 388 (2006)). 
31 NSGC, Position Statement on Human Gene Patenting (2010). 
http://www.nsgc.org/Advocacy/PositionStatements/tabid/107/Default.aspx. 
32 SACGHS report at 62. 
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effective test for the full panel of human genes.33  In the case at hand, the BRCA 
1/2 genes prevent researchers from including these genes in tests for other disease 
predispositions, including other forms of cancer, as well as in tests that 
simultaneously test for multiple genetic conditions.34 
B . 0\ULDG¶VPatents L imit Research On BR C A 1/2 and Other Diseases. 
The ³patent thicket´ heavily directs genetic research, forcing researchers to 
design their business models and research around any gene that has been patented 
or exclusively licensed.35  As a result, researchers are unable to provide the public 
with improved tests for BRCA 1/236 or a complete test for any other disease that 
BRCA 1/2 may be associated with.37     
Additionally, patents on the BRCA 1/2 genes place severe limits on data 
sharing.  Without competition, Myriad is slow to make research available to other 
researchers.  Myriad has stopped providing data to the Breast Cancer Information 
Core, a catalogue of all mutations and polymorphisms in breast cancer 
susceptibility genes whose principle aim is to facilitate the detection and 
characterization of these genes.38  Genetic tests often reveal genetic alterations 
GHVFULEHG DV ³YDULDQWV RI XQNQRZQ VLJQLILFDQFH´ WKDW UHVHDUFKHUV DUH XQDEOH WR                                                                                                                
33 Ledbetter Decl. ¶ 24, Aug. 20, 2009. 
34 Id. at ¶ 25. 
35 Id. at ¶ 14. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at ¶¶  24-25. 
38 Swisher Decl. ¶¶ 15, 19, Aug. 19, 2009. 
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interpret.  In order to determine whether these variants are benign or pathogenic, 
researchers need large datasets, normally pooled from many labs.  By hoarding 
clinical data for the BRCA 1/2 gene, Myriad prevents the greater genetic 
community from analyzing that data and making life-saving determinations about 
ZKHWKHU³YDULDQWVRIXQNQRZQVLJQLILFDQFH´DUH benign or a predictor for cancer.39 
Given the limitations set out in Madey v. Duke University, academic medical 
centers and companies fear liability for any infringing acts they commit in the 
course of experiments to develop a new genetic test.40  This view is substantiated 
E\0\ULDG¶VDggressive threats of litigation for outside testing of the BRCA 1/2. 
Finally, studies on the impact of gene patenting on scientific progress and 
commercialization reveal that gene patents decrease production of public genetic 
knowledge by 5-17%, a trend that is exacerbated when patents are broad in scope, 
privately owned, or closely linked to a cancerous disease.41 All three factors are 
SUHVHQWLQWKLVFDVH0\ULDG¶VSDWHQWVnegatively impact the accumulation of public 
knowledge of the BRCA 1/2 genes by between 5 and 10%.42   These results were 
mirrored in a National Human Genome funded survey of all laboratory directors in 
                                                                                                                
39 Ledbetter Decl. ¶ 20, Aug. 20, 2009; Swisher Decl. ¶ 18, Aug. 19, 2009. 
40 See SACGHS report at 73 (citing Madey v. Duke University, 307 F.3d 1351 
(Fed. Cir. 2003); (PEUH[ ,QFY6HUYLFH(QJ¶U&RUS, 216 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 
2000)).  
41 K. Huang & F. Murray, Patent Strategy, supra, at 22. 
42 Murray Decl. ¶ 20, Aug. 20, 2009. 
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the United States likely to be conducting genetic tests.43  53% decided against 
developing a new clinical genetic test because of a gene patent or license.44  67% 
believe that gene patents result in a decreased ability to perform research.45  25% 
stopped performing a clinical genetic test because of a gene patent or license.46  
65% of labs that responded reported contact by a patent or license holder regarding 
WKHODERUDWRU\¶VSRWHQWLDOLQIULQJHPHQWRIDSDWHQWE\SHUIRUPDQFHRIDJHQHWLFWHVW
including of the BRCA 1/2 genes.47  The American Society of Human Genetics 
similarly report that 46% of respondents felt that patents had delayed or limited 
their research.48  Likewise, a study analyzing the sequencing of the human genome 
by the Human Genome Project and the private firm Celera revealed a 30% 
reduction in subsequent scientific research and product development as a result of 
&HOHUD¶V LQWHOOHFWXDO SURSHUW\49  TKRXJK SDWHQW ODZ LV GHVLJQHG WR ³H[SDQG WKH
                                                                                                                
43 Cho Decl.  ¶¶  9-10, Aug. 17, 2009. 
44 Id. 
45 Id.  
46 Id. at. ¶ 11; Cho, MK et. al., Effects of Patents and Licenses On The Provision of 
Clinical Genetic Testing Services, 5 J. of Molecular Diagnostics 3 (2003). 
47 Cho Decl.. ¶¶ 12-13, Aug. 17, 2009. 
48Id. at ¶ 10 (citing Rabino, I., How human geneticists in US view 
commercialization of the Human Genome Project, 29 Nature Genetics 15 (2002)).  
49 Heidi L. Williams, Intellectual Property Rights and Innovation1DW¶O%XUHDXRI
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16213, 2010), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w16213. 
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SXEOLF VWRUHKRXVH RI NQRZOHGJH´50 gene patents, and specifically the BRCA 1/2 
patents, discourage innovation and research. 
C. 7KH%5&$3DWHQWV&UHDWHD³'RXEOH0RQRSRO\´7KHUHE\
Undermining The Goals O f The Patent System. 
Because a test must match a gene as expressed in the human genome, it is 
impossible to invent around a genetic patent to create an equivalent, but non-
infringing invention.51  By securing a patent on the genetic information in the 
BRCA 1/2 genes, Myriad has left no alternative for genetic testing on those genes, 
FUHDWLQJDSRZHUIXO³GRXEOHPRQRSRO\´52  In such an environment, patentees are 
dissuaded from performing additional research, charging reasonable prices, or 
cross-licensing technology.53  In these situations, ³[p]rofit maximizing behavior 
and progress-PD[LPL]LQJEHKDYLRU´DUH³DWRGGV´54   
                                                                                                                
50 SACGHS report at 2. 
51 Andrew S. Robertson, The Role of Genetic Patents in Genetic Test Innovation 
and Access, 9 Nw. J. Tech. & Intell. Prop. 377 at *10 (2011). 
52 Gert Matthijs, The European Opposition Against the BRCA Gene Patents, 5 
Familial Cancer 95 (2006) (³2QH FDQQRW LQYHQW DURXnd the sequence if it is 
SDWHQWHGEHFDXVHHDFKJHQHDQGHDFKJHQHVHTXHQFHLVXQLTXHLQLWVNLQG´).  See 
also Gert Matthijs & Dicky Halley, European-Wide Opposition Against The Breast 
Cancer Gene Patents, 10 Eur. J. of Hum. Genetics 783 (2002) (³[w]hen the 
uniqueness of the genetic code is combined with the exclusive rights of patents, a 
WUXO\XQEUHDNDEOHPRQRSROLVWLFULJKWLVJHQHUDWHG´). 
53 Maureen E. Boyle, Leaving Room For Research: The Historical Treatment of 
The Common Law Research Exemption in Congress and the Courts, and Its 
Relationship To Biotech Law And Policy, 12 Yale J. L. & Tech. 269 (2010) (citing 
Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The 
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 6918 (1998)). 
54 Id. 
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This is the precisely the environment created here.  Myriad has inflated prices, 
delayed UHVHDUFKHUV¶ DFFHss to information, and inhibited the progress of genetic 
testing.  The BRCA 1/2 patents place restrictions on facts of nature that distort the 
efficient allocation of resources and harm the public health; the tremendous 
rewards granted to Myriad do not correspond to the social returns.55  This is indeed 
one of those instances in which ³too much patent protection can impede rather than 
µpromote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts.¶´ See $VV¶Q IRU0ROHFXODU
Pathology, 653 F.3d at 1380 (Bryson, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(citing Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 126 
(2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting from dismissal of writ as improvidently granted)). 
C O N C L USI O N 
For the foregoing reasons, amici respectfully request that the Court invalidate 
0\ULDG¶VSDWHQWVRQWKH%5&$JHQHVHTXHQFHV 
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